Auction Formats and Award Rules in Swedish Procurement Auctions

Sofia Lundberg ()

Rivista di Politica Economica, 2006, vol. 96, issue 1, 91-114

Abstract: This paper provides an empirical analysis of outcomes from Swedish procurement auctions given award criterion and auction format. The auctions are single-unit sealed bid auctions or their simultaneous counterpart and contracts can be awarded to the lo west bidder or in accordance with qualitative criteria. The empirical results provide no evidence of differences in winning bids depending on the auction format. The award rule on the other hand matters; a horizontal comparison shows higher winning bids on contracts awarded to other than the lowest bidder. The effect of bidder interaction and bidder identity is also considered.

JEL-codes: D44 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:96:y:2006:i:1:p:91-114

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