Crime, Education and Peer Pressure

Paolo Buonanno

Rivista di Politica Economica, 2006, vol. 96, issue 5, 89-110

Abstract: We present a dynamic two-period model of individual behaviour with heterogeneous agents in which individuals decide how to allocate their disposable time between education, crime and work in the legal sector. Education has a twofold effect: it implies higher expected wages in the legal sector, increasing the opportunity cost of committing crime and it has a sort of "civilization" effect that makes more costly to engage in criminal activities. We model this effect by introducing a peer pressure function.

JEL-codes: J24 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.rivistapoliticaeconomica.it/2006/set-ott/buonanno.php
Payment required

Related works:
Working Paper: Crime, Education and Peer Pressure (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:96:y:2006:i:5:p:89-110

Access Statistics for this article

Rivista di Politica Economica is currently edited by Gustavo Piga

More articles in Rivista di Politica Economica from SIPI Spa
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sabrina Marino ().