Divisione in lotti e competizione nelle gare di procurement: alcune linee guida

Riccardo Pacini (), Giancarlo Spagnolo and Matteo Zanza ()
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Riccardo Pacini: Università di Roma "Tor Vergata"
Matteo Zanza: Arthur D. Little Italia

Rivista di Politica Economica, 2008, vol. 98, issue 4, 149-194

Abstract: The number and the size of lots influence the degree of competition in a tendering procedure mainly through two channels, both related to the market structure: the number of participants and their bidding behaviour. This paper discusses the relation between lots, participation, competition and collusion in tendering procedures, and proposes two simple indexes that allow to evaluate whether expected competition increases or decreases when varying the number of lots. Also, it shows how and when the division into lots at the individual tender may affect dynamic competition, namely in future tenders for the same type of procurement and in tenders for different procurement contracts.

Keywords: procurement; competition; lots; bundling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 H57 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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