Direct Price Discrimination in the Hotelling Model: Competition and Collusion
Stefano Colombo ()
Rivista di Politica Economica, 2011, issue 3, 319-334
This paper reviews the main contributions of the literature regarding the effects of direct price discrimination within the Hotelling model. Moreover, we introduce an asymmetric Hotelling model and we show that the assumption of spatial asymmetry between firms is likely to alter the implications of price discrimination.
Keywords: price discrimination; hotelling model; competition; collusion. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L11 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rpo:ripoec:y:2011:i:3:p:319-334
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