Preventing and Resolving Banking and Sovereign Crises: Toward a New Institutional Framework

Jean Tirole

Rivista di Politica Economica, 2012, issue 3, 143-153

Abstract: Weak European institutions bear some responsibility for the current Eurozone crisis. The paper discusses various alleys for reforming European institutions, such as those in charge of monitoring countries and banks. It then discusses the future of solidarity within the Eurozone, as well as proposed reforms impacting risk sharing. It concludes with steps that might help restore confidence in the European Monetary Union

Keywords: European debt crisis; golden rules; banking regulation; joint liability; bailouts; private sector involvment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E62 F34 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rpo:ripoec:y:2012:i:3:p:143-153

Access Statistics for this article

Rivista di Politica Economica is currently edited by Gustavo Piga

More articles in Rivista di Politica Economica from SIPI Spa
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sabrina Marino ().