Some Economics of Banking Reform

John Vickers

Rivista di Politica Economica, 2012, issue 4, 11-35

Abstract: Where do we stand, five years on from the start of the crisis, on progress towards banking reform? Following a stock-take of current reform initiatives, the paper reviews some economics of public policy towards banks, in particular capital requirements and the role of structural regulation in making banking systems safer. Forms of separation between retail and investment banking are compared, notably ring-fencing and complete separation. The paper concludes with reflections on the wider European policy debate following the Liikanen Report. A central theme is that banking reform needs a welldesigned combination of policies towards loss-absorbency and structural reform

Keywords: banking; bail-outs; capital requirements; deposit guarantees; Glass-Steagall; resolution; ring-fencing; structural reform; Volcker rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Journal Article: Some Economics of Banking Reform (2012)
Working Paper: Some Economics of Banking Reform (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rpo:ripoec:y:2012:i:4:p:11-35

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