A Conjecture on Institutional Rationalities and Property Rights in Public Procurement of Innovation

Robert Ågren and Max Rolfstam

Rivista di Politica Economica, 2013, issue 2, 137-157

Abstract: The increased interest in using public procurement as a policy tool for innovation has renewed a need for understanding the procurement process. A conjecture on institutional rationalities and property rights is offered to explain the hurdles present for conducting successful procurement projects. If an efficient negotiation solution is to be achieved, participants in procurement projects need to be aware of the other participants’ institutional rationalities and actively consider these while concluding the terms of procurement projects. Consequently, future policy efforts towards increased innovation have to be targeting the process of public procurement of innovation, rather than focusing on regulatory issues.

Keywords: public procurement; institutions; property rights; innovation; bargaining games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D23 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rpo:ripoec:y:2013:i:2:p:137-157

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