Favouritism and Inefficiency in Procurement: Evidence from Public Works in Italy
Francesco Decarolis and
Cristina Giorgiantonio
Rivista di Politica Economica, 2013, issue 2, 161-189
Abstract:
This paper shows how favoritism in public procurement can emerge despite the use of rigid procedures for awarding contracts and of transparent criteria for allowing firms to bid. The paper analyzes data on the awarding of public works in Italy to illustrate how differences in fine regulation details across Italian local administrations have major implications in terms of favoritism toward local contractors and the overall efficiency of the procurement process. The findings are a cautionary tale about the benefits and risks of a decentralized procurement regulation and a warning about the problems facing green and innovation procurement.
Keywords: infrastructure; auctions; regulation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K23 L51 L90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rpo:ripoec:y:2013:i:2:p:161-189
Access Statistics for this article
Rivista di Politica Economica is currently edited by Gustavo Piga
More articles in Rivista di Politica Economica from SIPI Spa
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sabrina Marino ().