Gli effetti della legge n. 133 del 2008 sulle assenze per malattia nel settore pubblico

Francesco D’Amuri ()
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Francesco D’Amuri: Banca d’Italia - Servizio Struttura Economica, Roma

Rivista di Politica Economica, 2014, issue 1, 301-321

Abstract: This paper assesses the impact of a reform addressing absenteeism in the Italian public sector. When stricter monitoring was introduced together with an average 20% cut in replacement rates for civil servants on short sick leave, sickness absence decreased by 26.4%, eliminating the wedge in absence rates with comparable private sector workers. The impact substantially decreased when a subsequent policy change brought back monitoring to the pre-reform level, while leaving monetary incentives untouched. Results are confirmed by a variety of robustness checks and are not driven by the attenuation of the reform effects over time.

Keywords: monetary incentives; monitoring; effort; sickness absence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J32 J38 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rpo:ripoec:y:2014:i:1:p:301-321

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