Breaking up the Bank: Alternative Proposals to Separate Banking Activities. A Critical Analysis
Giampaolo Gabbi () and
Andrea Sironi ()
Rivista di Politica Economica, 2014, issue 2, 17-37
Since the onset of the recent financial crisis, discussions have been taking place around a set of proposals with a view to reducing the probability that 'it could happen again’. Along with new rules related to bank capital and liquidity buffers, the hyper-speculative exposure of some financial players has stimulated a debate on the recommendations that commercial banks and depositors should be ring-fenced. Theoretical assumptions and pros and cons of these proposals are compared, to conclude that a mixed regulatory model based on prudential and structural rules could fail the purpose to make the financial system both safe and efficient.
Keywords: financial regulation; investment banking; financial crisis. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G18 G21 G24 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rpo:ripoec:y:2014:i:2:p:17-37
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