Spatial Competition In Illicit Drug Markets: The Consequences Of Increased Drug Law Enforcement

David W. Rasmussen, Bruce Benson and David L. Sollars
Additional contact information
David W. Rasmussen: Florida State University
David L. Sollars: Auburn University

The Review of Regional Studies, 1993, vol. 23, issue 3, 219-236

Abstract: This paper explores the impact of increasing drug enforcement on the violent crime rate in the context of spatial competition in illicit drug markets. Violence is an important aspect of competition in illicit markets because disputes cannot be resolved in the courts. A model of spatial competition suggests higher drug enforcement in one jurisdiction will increase the size of the drug market in an adjoining jurisdiction, resulting in a higher violent crime rate. Data from Florida jurisdictions suggest that geographic spillovers of violent crime result from law enforcement differentials and imply that they are much larger than those found in studies of property crime.

Date: 1993
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Downloads: (external link)
http://journal.srsa.org/ojs/index.php/RRS/article/view/23.3.2/pdf/ To View On Journal Page
http://journal.srsa.org/ojs/index.php/RRS/article/download/23.3.2/497 To Download Article

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rre:publsh:v23:y:1993:i:3:p:219-236

Access Statistics for this article

The Review of Regional Studies is currently edited by Tammy Leonard & Lei Zhang and Lei Zhang

More articles in The Review of Regional Studies from Southern Regional Science Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tammy Leonard & Lei Zhang ().