Is the Bureaucrat the Main Responsible for Corruption?

Gerasimos Soldatos

Review of Applied Socio-Economic Research, 2016, vol. 12, issue 2, 12-18

Abstract: The combination of a simple game-theoretic interaction between two firms bidding for a public project and the possibility of moral hazard on the part of the public official who is in charge of this project results in the proposition that there cannot be corruption unless the public official signals so. The result is lower quantity and quality of the goods and services offered through public projects. The combination of a simple game-theoretic interaction between two firms bidding for a public project and the possibility of moral hazard on the part of the public official who is in charge of this project results in the proposition that there cannot be corruption unless the public official signals so. The result is lower quantity and quality of the goods and services offered through public projects

Keywords: public project; moral hazard; public official corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 D82 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://reaser.eu/RePec/rse/wpaper/REASER12_3Soldatos_p12-18.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rse:wpaper:v:12:y:2016:i:2:p:12-18

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Applied Socio-Economic Research is currently edited by Ruxandra Vasilescu

More articles in Review of Applied Socio-Economic Research from Pro Global Science Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Manuela Epure ().