Central counterparty auction design

Gerardo Ferrara, Xin Li and Daniel Marszalec

Journal of Financial Market Infrastructures

Abstract: We analyze the role of auctions in managing the default of a central counterparty's clearing member. We first consider two established sealed-bid auction formats in which clearing members simultaneously submit bids for a defaulting clearing member's portfolio: first price and first price with budget constraints. We argue that the use of some form of penalty could have significant implications for financial stability by inefficiently distributing losses deriving from the unallocated portfolio to surviving clearing members. In response to these potential adverse implications, we propose a third auction type, second price with loss-sharing, which increases the revenue by allowing bidders to consider potential losses within their bidding function without passively waiting for a possible form of penalty.

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