On the Coincidence of the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set and the Core

José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez and Cori Vilella

Journal of Social Economics, 2015, vol. 2, issue 3, 117-121

Abstract: In this paper we analyze the coincidence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the core for the class of balanced and super additive cooperative games. We prove the coincide for the three-player games. This is no longer true neither without the super additivity condition nor for games with more than three-players. Furthermore, under the same assumptions, the coincidence between the Mas-Collel and the individual rational bargaining set (Vohra (1991)) is revealed.

Keywords: Cooperative game; Mas-Colell bargaining set; balancedness; individual rational bargaining set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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