Optimal Rent-Seeking Group

Sanghack Lee

The American Economist, 1992, vol. 36, issue 2, 58-60

Abstract: This note characterizes rent-seeking competition under the possibility of cooperation between rent seekers. Rational individuals are shown either to form a group to fight for the rent or not, depending upon costs and benefits of group formation. In the normative respect, group formation by rent seekers turns out to reduce social wastes resulting from rent-seeking competition.

Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:amerec:v:36:y:1992:i:2:p:58-60

DOI: 10.1177/056943459203600207

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