Contractual Governance in Trucking: Maislin V. Primary Steel and the Undercharge Crisis

Brian R. Smith

The American Economist, 1993, vol. 37, issue 1, 56-63

Abstract: This paper analyzes the structure of post-deregulation contracting in the trucking industry from a transactions-cost perspective, focusing on the effects of frequent transactions, specific investment, and rate uncertainty. Contrasting the “filed rate doctrine†and “negotiated rates policy,†it examines the “undercharge crisis†and the impact of the Supreme Court's ruling in Maislin v. Primary Steel. The paper concludes that Maislin failed dramatically to eliminate rate uncertainty, but despite the impassioned protests of shippers, the decision reduced only slightly the incentive for them to enter into long-term freight contracts.

Date: 1993
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:amerec:v:37:y:1993:i:1:p:56-63

DOI: 10.1177/056943459303700107

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