Upstream Mergers, Downstream Mergers, and Unionized Oligopoly

Shu-Hua Chang

The American Economist, 2005, vol. 49, issue 2, 67-74

Abstract: In a duopolistic industry characterized by unobserved vertical contracts, and where there are two vertical chains with two upstream manufacturers selling to two downstream retailers, we show that the wage is jointly determined by the union and the firm through bargaining and that the wage bargaining power of the union under different regimes, regardless of whether an upstream merger or a downstream merger takes place, will determine the degree of the welfare damage effect. It is also found that an upstream or a downstream monopolist, regardless of whether it possesses the right to franchise, will exert no impact on the equilibrium outputs and total profit, and will only affect the distribution of profits within the vertical chain.

Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/056943450504900208 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:amerec:v:49:y:2005:i:2:p:67-74

DOI: 10.1177/056943450504900208

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The American Economist from Sage Publications
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().