On the Political Economy of Binational Counter-Terrorism

Edmund H. Mantell

The American Economist, 2007, vol. 51, issue 2, 89-100

Abstract: This paper applies game theory to explore the economic incentives facing foreign nations sheltering terrorists. The players are a nation that has been a target of international terrorist activities and a nation that is a host (willing or unwilling) of international terrorists. The economics of multinational terrorism involve the costs to host nations of sanctions imposed by the U.S. and others, as well as the economic benefits transferred to the host nations by terrorist groups that they shelter. The main result shows that coalitions between international terrorists and their host nations allow the latter to sell licenses to terrorists thereby frustrating the counter-terrorist activities of victim nations.

Date: 2007
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/056943450705100212 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:amerec:v:51:y:2007:i:2:p:89-100

DOI: 10.1177/056943450705100212

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The American Economist from Sage Publications
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().