Toward An Econometric Model of Guzman'S Theory of Customary International Law

Ryan Luby

The American Economist, 2011, vol. 56, issue 2, 98-107

Abstract: The United States' recent incursions into both Iraq and Afghanistan have resituated debates concerning the validity and effectiveness of customary international law (CIL). On the one hand, scholars such as Goldsmith and Bradley argue that CIL is neither valid nor effective. Recently, Guzman formulated a response to such arguments as those proposed by Goldsmith and Bradley (1997). In a lucid critique of Goldsmith's argument, Guzman categorizes such arguments as “doctrinal†(2006). Instead, Guzman proposes a game theoretic model that seeks to quantify “reputation†in order to ascertain a given norm's status as CIL. The following paper proposes an econometric model in order to operationalize Guzman's theory of CIL. Indeed, looking at a politically and economically diverse group of five countries between the years of 1960 and 2008, the analysis herein suggests a more nuanced conception of CIL than the absolutist position of Goldsmith.

Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:amerec:v:56:y:2011:i:2:p:98-107

DOI: 10.1177/056943451105600212

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