A Note on Monitoring Costs and Voter Fraud
Philip Graves (),
Robert L. Sexton and
The American Economist, 2014, vol. 59, issue 2, 134-138
Election fraud can threaten democracy if many ineligible people are allowed to vote. The usual policy prescription is to increase monitoring cost. However, this is very costly. This paper proposes a more cost effective strategy: substitute tougher and consistent statutes across states against voter fraud.
Keywords: voting; fraud; monitoring costs; deterrence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:amerec:v:59:y:2014:i:2:p:134-138
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