A Note on Monitoring Costs and Voter Fraud

Philip Graves (), Robert L. Sexton and Gary Galles

The American Economist, 2014, vol. 59, issue 2, 134-138

Abstract: Election fraud can threaten democracy if many ineligible people are allowed to vote. The usual policy prescription is to increase monitoring cost. However, this is very costly. This paper proposes a more cost effective strategy: substitute tougher and consistent statutes across states against voter fraud.

Keywords: voting; fraud; monitoring costs; deterrence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:amerec:v:59:y:2014:i:2:p:134-138

DOI: 10.1177/056943451405900204

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