EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Game Theoretic Choices Between Corrupt Dictatorship Exit Emoluments and Nation-Building CDR Benefits: Is There a Nash Equilibrium?

Dennis Ridley and Aryanne de Silva

The American Economist, 2020, vol. 65, issue 1, 51-77

Abstract: Recent developments in economic theory have established that gross domestic product (GDP) is determined almost entirely by the institutions of capitalism, democracy, and rule of law (CDR). To raise GDP, a corrupt dictator-led country must raise its CDR index. Its corrupt ruler aims to maximize his personal wealth in what he perceives to be a zero sum game. He maximizes personal wealth from a certainty undeserved large share of low GDP versus a deserved small share of high GDP, the former share being larger than the latter in absolute value. We explore the question of how to pay off the corrupt dictator with an emolument, conditional on the dictator reforming or leaving the country, and replaced by a democratically elected government. A game is designed such that when played, it reveals the Nash equilibrium emolument that the reformed or exiting corrupt leader and the entering nation-builders will agree to. JEL Classifications : A20, A22

Keywords: political economy; entrepreneurship; capitalist; capitalism; democracy; rule of law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0569434519878858 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:amerec:v:65:y:2020:i:1:p:51-77

DOI: 10.1177/0569434519878858

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The American Economist from Sage Publications
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().

 
Page updated 2020-06-17
Handle: RePEc:sae:amerec:v:65:y:2020:i:1:p:51-77