Limits and Problems of Decompression: The Case of Hungary

Paul Kecskemeti
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Paul Kecskemeti: RAND Corporation

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1958, vol. 317, issue 1, 97-106

Abstract: Anxious to dilute authority within the Communist regimes in the satellite countries, Stalin's successors in 1953 compelled Hungary's party boss, Mátyás Rákosi, to share power with a moderate Communist, Imre Nagy. The Moscow center hereafter consistently sought to balance one set of Communist powerholders in Hungary against another. It is shown how this manipulation policy eventually undermined the stability of the Hungarian regime and rendered it unable to stem the tide of revolt provoked by accumulated past grievances.

Date: 1958
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:317:y:1958:i:1:p:97-106

DOI: 10.1177/000271625831700113

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