The Bureaucracy in Pressure Politics

J. Leiper Freeman
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J. Leiper Freeman: Vanderbilt University

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1958, vol. 319, issue 1, 10-19

Abstract: Public administrative agencies in many ways re semble and behave like pressure groups. They not only ad minister laws, but they attempt to influence public opinion and legislative action, promoting the interests of their members and of related groups. General statutory regulations do not re strict them noticeably in this regard, although in some impor tant ways the Chief Executive does, especially through budg etary, personnel, and other organizational controls. Never theless, public bureaucracies enjoy considerable autonomy to propose public policies and promote their adoption. By day-to-day liaison with legislators, avenues are kept open for administrative lobbying. Most crucial in the legislative ac tivities of executive agencies is their strategic work with com mittees considering bills in the legislature. Among the critical kinds of support which may be mobilized here are executive superiors, employees, and clientele. Also, by elaborating their administrative structure, bureaucracies enlist the interest and participation of influential citizens as advisors and sponsors. Additionally, bureaucracies may bring pressure to bear upon legislators through the exercise of administrative discretion. Finally, in the publicity arena, bureaucrats have certain privi leged positions, although they may invite legislative reprisals through overzealous propagandizing.

Date: 1958
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:319:y:1958:i:1:p:10-19

DOI: 10.1177/000271625831900103

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