The Bar, The Court, and The Delay

Harry Kalven
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Harry Kalven: University of Chicago

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1960, vol. 328, issue 1, 37-45

Abstract: The trial bar has often been made the whipping boy for the court congestion problem. The trial bar is often blamed for contributing to the congestion of the courts by pro viding an insufficient number of trial lawyers and by deliberate delay tactics. An investigation of these charges reveals that while much civil trial work is indeed concentrated in a few law offices, this concentration is not big enough to cause conges tion, if trial schedules are well laid out and adhered to. Nor need delaying tactics, while then affecting the individual case, increase congestion. If the courts assume a sufficiently firm policy of scheduling and refusals of last minute delays, the trial bar will be forced to respond by enlarging its ranks.

Date: 1960
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:328:y:1960:i:1:p:37-45

DOI: 10.1177/000271626032800105

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