 An Appraisal of the Antitrust ApproachSar A. Levitan
The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1961, vol. 333, issue 1, 108-118 Abstract: There is a revived interest in the application of antitrust legislation to unions. Those who favor this legisla tion assert that unions possess excessive power and enjoy spe cial immunities under the law. Even if the claim of the dam aging impact of unions were correct, it is rather doubtful whether the mere application of antitrust legislation would in itself provide the remedies sought by those who would weaken the power of unions in collective bargaining. The Taft-Hart ley Act already bans most union activities which were pro scribed by the courts when antitrust legislation was applied to unions during the first four decades following the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890. The sweeping application of antitrust legislation to unions would also result in confusion as to al lowable area of union activities and present obstacles to the achievement of sound labor-management relations. More over, the techniques used in trust-busting are not applicable to unions. Encouragement of competition among unions would tend to raise the cost of labor. However, the antitrust route, with its strong sanctions and ability to supply speedy relief through injunctions, may be useful as a tool to discour age specific harmful union activities. Date: 1961 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:333:y:1961:i:1:p:108-118 DOI: 10.1177/000271626133300110 Access Statistics for this article More articles in The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science |
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