India after the Chinese Attack

Henry C. Hart
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Henry C. Hart: University of Wisconsin

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1964, vol. 351, issue 1, 50-57

Abstract: The Chinese invasion of October-November 1962 shocked the Indian masses as no event since 1947. However, it did not draw them into increasing their agricultural yields or even stepping up their industrial output to the planned rate. India is not fulfilling her plan of preparedness combined with general economic growth. Leadership is diffuse and does not reach the ultimate farm and factory producers. Yet the shock of invasion did sufficiently activate new strata of the voters so that they can now resist some of the mobilization measures adopted since the Chinese withdrawal. This accelerates the crisis in leadership which had already, even before 1962, been looming for a future decade.

Date: 1964
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:351:y:1964:i:1:p:50-57

DOI: 10.1177/000271626435100107

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