The Intelligence of Congress: Information and Public-Policy Patterns

Edward Schneier

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1970, vol. 388, issue 1, 14-24

Abstract: Proposals for improved information systems for legislatures have become a standard feature of the literature on legislative systems. Most of these proposals, however, either fail to take account of political realities or have a centralizing bias which is likely to prove incongenial to most legislators. Given the functionally fragmented structure of American politics, the methods that congressmen use to gather information are essentially rational, and likely, therefore, to prove highly resilient to change. But the form of rationality which the legislative intelligence system now favors is ill-suited to the policy needs of the society, particularly in those instances where the need for establishing orders of priority is most urgent. It may, thus, be particularly important to develop new intelligence systems in the executive branch, and in the private sector, to supplement, challenge, and engage the entrenched system of legislative intelligence.

Date: 1970
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:388:y:1970:i:1:p:14-24

DOI: 10.1177/000271627038800103

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