Wars Prolonged by Misunderstood Signals

George H. Quester

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1970, vol. 392, issue 1, 30-39

Abstract: Various kinds of stimulus for war can be identi fied. Men and nations may simply be incompatible with each other. Both sides may expect a prolonged war to pro duce military victory, at least one of them necessarily being in error. The strategic situation may handsomely reward those who violate truces and launch sneak attacks. Each side may be overrating the other's willingness to launch such at tacks, thereby misunderstanding the other's commitment to peace. History offers a number of examples of wars prolonged by misunderstanding of peace signals. Yet the stimuli listed suggest that the explanation for any war typically must be more complicated. Statesmen may therefore misunderstand signals because they want to, because basic strategy suggests they come out better that way.

Date: 1970
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:392:y:1970:i:1:p:30-39

DOI: 10.1177/000271627039200104

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