Dimensions of Judicial Federalism

John W. Winkle
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John W. Winkle: Duke University

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1974, vol. 416, issue 1, 67-76

Abstract: Distribution of power between national and subnational judiciaries is a significant yet often overlooked dimension of American federalism. Jurisdictional overlap between state and federal courts has long generated adminis trative and political tensions that strike at the heart of inter governmental viability. Acute questions of intersystem equi librium arise in the consideration of judicial federalism. The dual court configuration materially affects litigant behavior, judicial policy making, and court administration. Intersystem reconciliation assumes greater importance in light of modern demands of spiraling litigation. This article seeks to raise some of the myriad issues of judicial federalism.

Date: 1974
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:416:y:1974:i:1:p:67-76

DOI: 10.1177/000271627441600107

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