Revenue Sharing and Structural Features of American Federalism

Deil S. Wright
Additional contact information
Deil S. Wright: University of Michigan

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1975, vol. 419, issue 1, 100-119

Abstract: This article examines the impact of general revenue sharing on three structural features of American federalism: (1) governmental entities (number and employ ment) ; (2) institutions and actors' roles; and (3) behavioral perspectives. Revenue sharing will probably inhibit the further proliferation of special districts, sustain some town ships that might atrophy, increase public employment levels, and foster or accentuate the secular shift of state govern ment toward a service-oriented component of the federal system. General revenue sharing is both a cause and an effect of pluralistic power patterns. It is an important resource for political-administrative generalists in counteracting the influence of functional or program specialists. The generalist coalition, however, exhibits fragile features when compared with the strengths of policy making subsystems in Washing ton. Existing competitive, taut, and tension-laden inter governmental relationships are in part the product of partic ipants' perceptions. General revenue sharing appears to have relaxed tense relations by altering behavioral perspectives.

Date: 1975
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/000271627541900110 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:419:y:1975:i:1:p:100-119

DOI: 10.1177/000271627541900110

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().