Reducing the Incentives to Proliferation

George H. Quester
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George H. Quester: Cornell University

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1977, vol. 430, issue 1, 70-81

Abstract: There are two very different kinds of incentives to nuclear proliferation. We are used to seeing nations deter potential enemies and win political concessions with such weapons. A newer, very different, kind of incentive stems from the economic overlap between peaceful electric power reactors and the production of weapons-grade plutonium or enriched uranium; there may now be an economic cost to steering away from the bomb, rather than a cost to making it. Reducing the political-military incentives to proliferation will require a case-by-case approach. Some of these incen tives can be decreased by extending the American nuclear umbrella, as for Europe and Japan. But a serious problem can then emerge in preventing proliferation by such "outlaw states" as South Africa, Israel, and Taiwan. For much of the world, moreover, the bomb will be more of a political- prestige item than a military tool, so that a superpower nuclear umbrella would be redundant or counter-productive. Reducing the economic incentives will also require a case-by- case approach. This cannot be achieved by simply cutting off technological assistance in the nuclear field. Rather, it must be done by using such assistance as a subtle "carrot" or "stick," to persuade the leaders of countries like Brazil and Japan to stay away from bombs.

Date: 1977
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:430:y:1977:i:1:p:70-81

DOI: 10.1177/000271627743000108

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