Justice and the Insanity Defense

Hyman Gross

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1985, vol. 477, issue 1, 96-103

Abstract: Making insane persons liable for their criminal acts may be unjust. There are two reasons for this. If such persons are handicapped by mental illness in a way that deprives them of the ability to abide by the law, they enjoy the same excuse as anyone else who is helpless, and recognition of the excuse is a requirement of justice. Furthermore, the suffering inevitably produced by making a person liable to criminal punishment turns out to be unjustifiable in such a case, since in these circumstances the punishment is unnecessary. The injustice of punishing such persons must not be confused, however, with the injustice of holding liable a person whose act was without those mental elements required under the law for a particular crime. Conceived broadly, there are four varieties of disability that matter for a defense of insanity, and for policy reasons there must be some definite pathology to account for their presence if they are to be acceptable as the basis of a defense of insanity.

Date: 1985
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:477:y:1985:i:1:p:96-103

DOI: 10.1177/0002716285477001009

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