Of Philosophers, Foxes, and Finances: Can the Federal Election Commission Ever Do an Adequate Job?

William C. Oldaker

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1986, vol. 486, issue 1, 132-145

Abstract: This article assesses the effectiveness of the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in today's environment by discussing three types of constraints that limit the FEC's authority: contextual, legal, and administrative. The contextual restraint is seen in the unique political position in which the FEC finds itself, regulating its maker and benefactor, the Congress. The legal constraints involve the First Amendment and its interplay with the statutes that the FEC administers. Finally, the article addresses the administrative constraints under which the FEC must labor, and it examines two frequent charges against the commission: the politicalization of its enforcement procedure and the assertion that the FEC pursues petty infractions. The article concludes that the FEC deserves a mixed review, noting that it stumbles in its attempt to keep the foxes out of the chicken coop and the chickens in during congressional elections. The FEC must be made far more independent to be effective.

Date: 1986
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:486:y:1986:i:1:p:132-145

DOI: 10.1177/0002716286486001011

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