Political Finance in the Liberal Republic: Representation, Equality, and Deregulation

Stephen Harder

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1986, vol. 486, issue 1, 49-63

Abstract: The intervention by Congress in the private funding of federal election campaigns is fundamentally misconceived. The field should be deregulated. Proponents of intervention believe that the unregulated private financing of election campaigns subverts our representative institutions. This is because, they believe, first, that disparities in campaign spending often decide elections; second, that the pattern of campaign contributions received by a legislator significantly influences that legislator's lawmaking behavior; and, third, that the private financing of political activity injects the economic inequalities of the marketplace into the sphere of political rights. However, a whole view of the complex worlds of elections and legislation suggests that these beliefs, despite their superficial plausibility, are unsupported by reason and experience. In fact, the private market for political finance, left unregulated, should consistently deny to any discrete group of participants the market power necessary to influence elections or legislation significantly. Furthermore, the partial regulation attempted to date has been easily circumvented, and more comprehensive regulation is substantially barred by the constitutional sanctity of political speech and association. Finally, a system of private political finance, free from government intervention, is reconcilable with the legitimate operations of our representative government and with the true meaning of political equality.

Date: 1986
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:486:y:1986:i:1:p:49-63

DOI: 10.1177/0002716286486001004

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