The Consequences of Budget Reform for Congressional-Presidential Relations

James A. Thurber

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1988, vol. 499, issue 1, 101-113

Abstract: The struggle between Congress and the president over spending and taxing was altered significantly by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 1985. The purpose of this article is to evaluate the impact of these reforms on congressional-presidential budgeting. The analysis answers two questions: What are the major budgetary reforms that have influenced congressional-presidential relations, and what have been the consequences of these changes? The article concludes that the budget reforms have strengthened the congressional role vis-Ã -vis the president's role in the budget-making process. Macro-budgetary and macro economic trade-offs between Congress and the president are highlighted. In sum, the reforms have made budgeting between the president and Congress more difficult. They have increased the number of budgetary participants, made the budget process more open, forced the president to work more closely with Congress, and allowed Congress gradually to tighten control over executive spending discretion.

Date: 1988
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:499:y:1988:i:1:p:101-113

DOI: 10.1177/0002716288499001008

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