Congressional Oversight of the Presidency

Frederick M. Kaiser

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1988, vol. 499, issue 1, 75-89

Abstract: Congressional oversight of the executive, including the presidency itself, has evidently increased over the past two decades. It relies upon a wide variety of techniques and occurs in a number of settings, not just select committee investigations or specialized subcommittee hearings labeled oversight. Other means range from hearings on authorizations and regular bills to informal meetings between legislators and executive officials; and from House impeachment proceedings to the use of offices outside Congress, such as inspectors general and independent counsels. Oversight does not exist in a political vacuum; the impetus behind it is often a conflict between the two branches over public policy or over competing institutional interests and powers. In addition, the apparent growth in the amount of oversight and the wide use of different means are the results of changes in Congress, including improved resources and incentives for members; changes in the presidency, especially the expanded operational role of its personnel; and changes in the polity, such as the rise of investigative journalism and electoral developments that have helped to divide party control of government.

Date: 1988
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:499:y:1988:i:1:p:75-89

DOI: 10.1177/0002716288499001006

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