The Price for Effective Verification in an Era of Expanding Arms Control

BLISS McFATE Patricia and Sidney N. Graybeal

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1988, vol. 500, issue 1, 73-90

Abstract: Arms control has become an increasingly important aspect of U.S. security and foreign policy; at the same time, verification has emerged as the major consideration in judging arms-control agreements. Although the concept of military significance has been used as the criterion for determining effective verification of arms-control agreements over several presidential administrations, the demand for stringent and comprehensive verification regimes has increased in the past seven years to the point where implementing the regimes for the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) agreements will be costly, albeit beneficial because the agreements will contribute to bilateral relations and international security. The verification regime being put into place for the INF Treaty is the most rigorous and comprehensive ever negotiated. Verification of the START agreement will be far more extensive and expensive due to its broader scope and the fact that it reduces rather than eliminates classes of weapons. This article analyzes the verification criteria, costs, and benefits associated with current bilateral arms-control endeavors.

Date: 1988
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:500:y:1988:i:1:p:73-90

DOI: 10.1177/0002716288500001006

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