Obstacles to Economic Reform of Socialism: A Property-Rights Approach

Jan Winiecki

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1990, vol. 507, issue 1, 65-71

Abstract: This article sketches briefly an answer to the question of why economic reforms fail under the Soviet-type system in spite of the obvious interest of the respective ruling groups in improving the performance of their ailing economies. The author, applying a property-rights approach, points to the fact that all segments of the ruling stratum benefit from maintaining an undemocratic political system, but party apparatchiks and economic bureaucrats benefit also from the persistent interference in the patently inefficient economic system. Therefore they are most interested in maintaining the status quo in the economic system as well. Moreover, since the rulers turn to them for the design and implementation of reforms, their chances for preventing, distorting, and/or aborting reforms are all the greater.

Date: 1990
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:507:y:1990:i:1:p:65-71

DOI: 10.1177/0002716290507001007

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