Crimes Against the Environment: Superfund Enforcement at Last

Harold C. Barnett

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1993, vol. 525, issue 1, 119-133

Abstract: The success of the Superfund program rests substantially on the ability of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to induce major corporations to share in the cost of a multibillion-dollar hazardous waste site cleanup effort. Over the past decade, EPA enforcement strategy has evolved from highly accommodative to much more enforcement oriented. Reports also indicate a substantial increase in application of Superfund's most powerful enforcement tools. Industrial targets of EPA enforcement are attempting to shift partial liability and transaction costs onto third parties. Viewed against the economic and political evolution of EPA strategy, a continuation of the enforcement-first approach depends on the willingness of society to accept the costs of sanctioning the powerful.

Date: 1993
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0002716293525001010 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:525:y:1993:i:1:p:119-133

DOI: 10.1177/0002716293525001010

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().