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Flexibility in Conflict Episodes

Dean G. Pruitt

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1995, vol. 542, issue 1, 100-115

Abstract: Negotiation is usually an outgrowth of a broader conflict episode in which one party, the claimant, is trying to persuade another party, the respondent, to take an action it does not wish to take. Claimants typically employ a script-driven sequence of tactics, changing their approach until the conflict is resolved or they give up. If negotiation is part of this sequence, it ordinarily comes after moderate escalation. Six of the most common tactics in conflict episodes are forms of firm flexibility: concede but only to a point, hold firm on one's position while seeking a way to compensate the other, hold firm on more important issues while conceding on less important issues, hold firm on one's interests while seeking novel ways to achieve these interests, hold firm on more important interests while abandoning less important interests, and hold firm if one's interests seem stronger than those of the other party and yield if the other's interests seem stronger. The last of these tactics leads to high joint benefit in continuing relationships. If continuing relationships are fragile, there is a tendency to emphasize flexibility over firmness. By contrast, in conflict episodes involving organizations, firmness tends to be emphasized over flexibility. Several remedies are suggested for the latter problem.

Date: 1995
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:542:y:1995:i:1:p:100-115

DOI: 10.1177/0002716295542001007

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