Situational Levers of Position Change: Further Explorations

Daniel Druckman

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1995, vol. 542, issue 1, 61-80

Abstract: Negotiated agreements often depend on the willingness of bargainers to change their positions. This willingness is shown to depend in large part on certain aspects of the negotiating situation. This article reports the results of simulation experiments that demonstrate increased flexibility when the negotiations are held in private at remote locations. Talks under such conditions have a stronger impact on bargaining behavior than do suggestions made by a mediator. Bargainers were also responsive to the timing of their opponent's moves: more agreements occurred when their opponent demonstrated early firmness followed by later flexibility. The variables explored in the experiments were also used to diagnose outcomes of historical and contemporary cases. Correspondences found between the diagnosed and actual outcomes provide support for the relevance of these variables as influences on the flexibility of international negotiators.

Date: 1995
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:542:y:1995:i:1:p:61-80

DOI: 10.1177/0002716295542001005

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