The Elusive Safeguards of Federalism

Marci A. Hamilton
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Marci A. Hamilton: New York University School of Law

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2001, vol. 574, issue 1, 93-103

Abstract: The Supreme Court has issued a series of opinions that turn on the Constitution's inherent principles of federalism, decisions that have alarmed many a legal scholar. The Court has been attacked for overstepping its bounds and, by some, on the grounds that the federalism-state balance should be maintained through the political process rather than judicial review. This criticism of the judicial enforcement of federalism fails as a matter of constitutional history and on empirical grounds. The Supreme Court in this era deserves praise, not criticism, for its recent federalism jurisprudence.

Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:574:y:2001:i:1:p:93-103

DOI: 10.1177/000271620157400107

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