Denying Armageddon: Preventing Terrorist Use of Nuclear Weapons

Michael V. Hynes, John E. Peters and Joel Kvitky
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Michael V. Hynes: RAND Santa Monica
John E. Peters: RAND Santa Monica
Joel Kvitky: RAND Santa Monica

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2006, vol. 607, issue 1, 150-161

Abstract: The United States can significantly reduce the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist attack if it pursues a vigorous, multilayered approach. Such an approach involves controlling nuclear technology and materials, manipulating the black market, and monitoring the behavior of aspiring nuclear actors. After analyzing each of these components, this article outlines the broad contours of a national preventative strategy that should give the nonproliferation community some cause for optimism.

Keywords: nuclear terrorism; special nuclear materials; nuclear technology; personnel; black market; preventative strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:607:y:2006:i:1:p:150-161

DOI: 10.1177/0002716206290943

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