A Nuclear Response to Nuclear Terror: Ref lections of Nuclear Preemption

Andrei Kokoshin
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Andrei Kokoshin: State Duma of the Russian Federation, School of World Politics of the Lomonosov's Moscow State University

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2006, vol. 607, issue 1, 59-63

Abstract: The threat of nuclear terrorism in the United States has led its leadership to contemplate an extreme military response—namely, nuclear preemption. To some preemption proponents, nuclear weapons are no longer considered the option of last resort. This article argues that reducing the nuclear threshold for some international actors and not others is perhaps just as dangerous as the proliferation the nuclear preemption doctrine is trying counter. The nuclear “taboo†has once again ceased to exist.

Keywords: nuclear terrorism; nuclear preemption; low-yield nuclear weapons; Nuclear Posture Review (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:607:y:2006:i:1:p:59-63

DOI: 10.1177/0002716206290357

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