 The Ogaden War and the Demise of DétenteDonna R. Jackson
The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2010, vol. 632, issue 1, 26-40 Abstract: The failure of détente has been a popular theme among historians of American foreign policy, with opinions divided as to where the responsibility for this failure lies. A commonality among all points of view, however, is the importance of events in the third world, particularly in the “Arc of Crisis.†One such event—the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia— prompted Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s national security advisor, to comment that détente was “buried†in the Ogaden. His point was that Carter’s new approach to the cold war was put to the test during the Ogaden War, and there the policy’s untenability was proven. The policy’s failure, in turn, encouraged Soviet adventurism, which further alienated the American public from Carter’s attempt to fight the cold war. Carter’s policy eventually led to the withdrawal of the SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) Treaty and, as Brzezinski claimed, the collapse of détente. This article discusses Carter’s foreign policy toward the Ogaden War, considers the accuracy of Brzezinski’s claim, and reaches conclusions regarding the role of the Carter administration in the demise of détente. Keywords: Carter; détente; Ethiopia; Somalia; Ogaden; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:632:y:2010:i:1:p:26-40 Access Statistics for this article More articles in The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science |
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