Interlocking Patrimonialisms and State Formation in Qing China and Early Modern Europe

Liping Wang and Julia Adams

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2011, vol. 636, issue 1, 164-181

Abstract: Familial power contributed to binding territories together and systematically severing them in both China and early modern European states. In the early Qing (1644–1911) Empire, Manchu conquerors met the challenges of securing and expanding rule by discovering ways to use laterally related brothers and imperial bondservants to hold Chinese bureaucrats in check, while deploying bureaucracy to restrain princely brothers from partitioning the state. The ensuing interlock of patrimonial practices and bureaucracy, developed in a style similar to ancien régime France, stabilized political power for centuries.

Keywords: bureaucracy; China; empire; Europe; patrimonialism; Qing; state (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:636:y:2011:i:1:p:164-181

DOI: 10.1177/0002716211402922

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