Self-Regulation in the Regulatory Void

Jodi L. Short

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2013, vol. 649, issue 1, 22-34

Abstract: Corporate self-regulation has been blamed for many of the worst environmental and financial catastrophes of the twenty-first century, but the failure of self-regulation in these catastrophes has been rivaled by failures of government regulation. This article explores the consequences of adopting self-regulation under conditions of failed or deficient government regulation. First, it identifies the conditions that produce the phenomenon of “blue moon†self-regulation, or self-regulation that successfully achieves public regulatory goals. Second, it develops a typology of regulatory voids in which self-regulation is commonly adopted and analyzes its prospects for success under each set of conditions. It concludes that prospects for self-regulatory success are particularly bleak in regulatory voids that have been created by the concerted political opposition of regulated entities.

Keywords: self-regulation; regulatory failure; regulatory design; new governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:649:y:2013:i:1:p:22-34

DOI: 10.1177/0002716213485531

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