The Macroeconomic Policy Paradox

Alan Blinder

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2013, vol. 650, issue 1, 26-46

Abstract: While objections can be (and have been) raised, the U.S. government’s multifaceted macroeconomic policy responses to the financial crisis after September 2008 appear to have been quite effective. Yet, politically, they are more reviled than admired. The paradox is that economic success—in the sense of averting much worse outcomes—turned into political failure. This article asks why.

Keywords: macroeconomic policy; financial crisis; monetary policy; fiscal policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:650:y:2013:i:1:p:26-46

DOI: 10.1177/0002716213493080

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