Theorizing Regulatory Intermediaries

Kenneth W. Abbott, David Levi-faur and Duncan Snidal

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2017, vol. 670, issue 1, 14-35

Abstract: Regulation is typically conceived as a two-party relationship between a rule-maker or regulator (R) and a rule-taker or target (T). We set out an agenda for the study of regulation as a three- (or more) party relationship, with intermediaries (I) at the center of the analysis. Intermediaries play major and varied roles in regulation, from providing expertise and feedback to facilitating implementation, from monitoring the behavior of regulatory targets to building communities of assurance and trust. After developing the basic regulator-intermediary-target (RIT) model, we discuss important extensions and variations of the model. We then discuss the varieties of regulatory capture that may appear where intermediaries are involved.

Keywords: intermediaries; rule-takers; rule-makers; regulation; regulatory governance; orchestration; capture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:670:y:2017:i:1:p:14-35

DOI: 10.1177/0002716216688272

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