 Not Quite the SameMartino Maggetti, Christian Ewert and Philipp Trein The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2017, vol. 670, issue 1, 152-169 Abstract: This article compares the role of regulatory intermediaries in the governance of pharmaceuticals and medical devices in Australia and Switzerland. We argue that the creation, selection, and activation of specific intermediaries depend on the organizational capacity of the regulator and on the potential of the intermediary to be captured by the target. To limit the risk of capture of intermediaries where the regulated industries are powerful, regulators tend to keep intermediaries under their control. To do so, the regulator must be well-funded and well-staffed, or supported by its political principal. However, when the target has limited capture potential, regulators will rely more heavily on externalized intermediaries. These intermediaries typically consist of transnational organizations in charge of multiple regulatory issues in several jurisdictions, and can provide unique expertise in an efficient way. Four case studies of the Australian and Swiss regulatory regimes for therapeutic products support this argument. Keywords: health policy; regulatory agencies; regulatory intermediaries; therapeutic products; Australia; Switzerland; regulatory governance (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:670:y:2017:i:1:p:152-169 Access Statistics for this article More articles in The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.